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Using a unique set of administrative data that includes draft eligibility, participation 
in the military service, and criminal records, we find that participation in the military 
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I. Introduction 
The initiation in criminal activities is, typically, a young men phenomenon. Most 
criminals  begin  their  participation  in  illegal  activities  as  juvenile  or  young  adult 
offenders (Freeman, 1996).
1 Thus, the study of the determinants of entry into criminal 
activities should pay particular attention to major events affecting young males.
2 In 
many  countries  one  of  these  important  events  is  the  mandatory  participation  in 
military  service.
3  Because  mandatory  military  service,  also  called  conscription, 
typically occurs before other life-shaping events (such as parenthood, marriage, and 
participation in the labor market), it maximizes the possibility of redirection in the 
behavior of young men (Elder, Modell, and Parke, 1993).  
Given the extended practice of conscription around the globe, its potentiality of 
shaping  young  men’s  behavior,  and  generalized  concerns  about  crime  in  several 
countries,  it  is  surprising  that  there  is  no  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of 
conscription on young men’s propensities toward violent and criminal behavior. Our 
main  contribution  to  the  literature  is  to  estimate  the  causal  effect  of  peace-time 
military conscription on crime. 
A  priori,  different  hypotheses  could  predict  a  positive  or  negative  effect  of 
conscription on the involvement into criminal behavior. Military conscription may 
have a positive influence on young men’s criminal prospects through a variety of 
channels. First, military training teaches young men obedience and discipline, which 
could  directly  affect  their  rates  of  criminality.  Second,  by  improving  health  and 
                                                 
1 Young  people and  males are much  more likely  than aged people and females to commit crime 
(Archer and Gartner, 1984; Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). In the US, for 
example, persons aged between 18 and 24 accounted for 28 percent of total property crime arrests, and 
77 percent of all arrestees were male (Pastore and Maguire, 2003).  
2 On the determinants of juvenile crime, see Case and Katz (1991); Levitt (1998); Grogger (1998); 
Levitt and Lochner (2001); Jacob and Lefgren (2003); Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005); and Bayer, 
Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2009). 
3 On the practice of military conscription around the world, see WRI (1998) and Mulligan and Shleifer 
(2005).   2 
nutrition  and  by  extending  the  social  networks  of  the  most  deprived  to  other 
socioeconomic  groups,  military  service  might  improve  labor  market  prospects, 
preventing  young  men  from  committing  property  crimes.  Third,  military  service 
incapacitates the commission of crime by keeping young men in military facilities 
and out of the streets at a crucial age.  
Alternatively, military conscription could have a detrimental influence on young 
men’s criminal behavior. First, by delaying the insertion of young men into the labor 
market  the  conscription  might  worsen  their  future  labor  market  opportunities, 
increasing the likelihood of committing property crimes.
4 Second, military service 
provides  firearm  training  that  reduces  the  entry  costs  into  crime,  potentially 
increasing  the  participation  in  arm-related  crimes.  Finally,  the  conscription  may 
constitute a social environment prone to violent responses, negative peer effects, and 
gang formation.
5 
Thus, a priori it is not clear whether the overall impact of military service on 
crime  rates  is  positive  or  negative,  which  underscores  the  need  for  empirical 
evidence. In order to identify the causal effect of conscription on crime we need to 
identify a variable that affects participation in the conscription but does not affect 
crime through any other mechanisms. To solve this problem, we take advantage of 
the conscription lottery in Argentina, which randomly assigned eligibility of young 
males to military service based on the last three numbers of their national ID. We 
exploit  this  random  assignment  to  identify  the  causal  effect  of  servicing  in  the 
conscription on the likelihood of later developing a criminal record.  
                                                 
4 Milton Friedman and other economists stressed the job market costs imposed on draftees in their 
interventions opposing the Vietnam draft in favour of a professional army (see Tax, 1967, and the 
“Economists’ Statement in Opposition to the Draft”). 
5 On violent responses by individuals trained in the use of weapons, see Bryant (1979). On crime and 
social interactions, see Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996).   3 
Using  a  unique  set  of  administrative  data  that  includes  draft  eligibility, 
participation in the military service, and criminal records for all male cohorts born 
between 1958 and 1962, complemented with data on draft eligibility and criminal 
records for the male cohorts born between 1929 and 1975, we find that participation 
in  the  conscription  increases  the  likelihood  of  developing  a  criminal  record  in 
adulthood, particularly for pecuniary (property and white collar) crimes. We also find 
that the conscription has detrimental effects on future job market performance. 
Previous studies exploit the natural experiment generated by the Vietnam draft 
lottery  to  analyze  the  impact  of  servicing  in  the  military  during  war  times  on  a 
number  of  outcomes,  such  as  future  earnings  (Angrist,  1990;  Angrist  and  Chen, 
2007),  alcohol  consumption  (Goldberg  et  al.,  1991),  cigarette  consumption 
(Eisemberg and Rowe, 2009), health (Angrist, Chen, and Frandsen, 2009; Dobkin and 
Shabini,  2009),  and  mortality  (Hearst,  Newman,  and  Hulley,  1986;  Conley  and 
Heerwig, 2009). 
In particular, previous studies have analyzed the relationship between being a war 
veteran  and  posterior  criminal  behavior  (see  Yager,  Laufer,  and  Gallops,  1984; 
Beckerman  and  Fontana,  1989;  Bouffard,  2003;  Rohlfs,  2006;  Mumola,  2007; 
Noonan  and  Mumola,  2007).  In  general,  the evidence  is  that combat exposure  is 
associated with an increase in the number of arrests and incarceration rates, though 
the effect is small. 
We differentiate from this previous literature by focusing on the crime effects of 
subjects that were drafted for military conscription in peace times. Subjects exposed 
to  combat  are  likely  to  suffer  from  post-traumatic  disorders.
6  Medical  studies 
                                                 
6 In particular, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the long-term emotional response to a highly 
traumatic event, is a diagnosis which was officially identified after the Vietnam War. PTSD is an 
emotional illness that develops as a result of a terribly frightening, life-threatening, or otherwise highly 
unsafe experience (American  Psychiatric Association,  1994).  For  the male  population, the  highest   4 
document that these patients report different attitudes toward violent crime, higher 
levels of self-reported aggression, and a higher incidence of potentially dangerous 
firearm-related  behavior  than  comparison  subjects  (see  McFall  et  al.,  1999,  and 
Freeman and Roca, 2001). Instead, individuals serving conscription in peace time are, 
in  principle,  not  exposed  to  the  kind  of  traumatic  events  that  causes  these  stress 
disorders and, therefore, the impact of serving the conscription in peace time is likely 
to be different from the impact of combat exposure. 
Indeed, since our database includes two cohorts that were drafted during the 1982 
Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom, we are able to identify 
the difference between being drafted into the military in peace and war times. As 
expected, our results suggest that the effect of conscription on criminal behavior is 
larger for those draftees in the cohorts that participated in the Malvinas War. The 
crime effects, however, are also significant for the cohorts that performed military 
service during peace times.  
Our findings have a broader policy scope than the existing literature on criminal 
and violent behavior of war veterans. Conscription, as a public policy, is a much more 
common phenomenon than armed conflict (for most countries, an unwanted and rare 
event).  Out  of  the  179  countries  from  which  we  were  able  to  find  conscription 
information (covering 99.8% of the world population), 94 countries have military 
service. Out of these 94 countries, 19 currently have an armed conflict of some type.
7 
Thus,  about  half  of  the  countries  of  the  world  have  mandatory  military  service 
without  being  involved  in  any  armed  conflict.  Our  results  suggest  that  higher 
criminality rates should be counted as an additional cost of conscription. 
                                                                                                                                          
prevalence rates are found among survivors of military combat. As reported by the National Center for 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, about 30% of Vietnam veterans suffer from PTSD. 
7 See the War Resisters’ International webpage at http://www.wri-irg.org/wri.htm (accessed 2007). Out 
of the 85 countries without conscription, eleven are involved in an armed conflict. See also WRI 
(1998).   5 
Instead, some countries have been recently discussing the re-implementation of 
conscription  to  address youth’s  conflicts.  For  example,  as  a  response  to  the  high 
levels of criminality in South Africa, Labor Minister Membathisi Mdladlana proposed 
that  army  conscription could  help  end  violent crime.  In  the  same  vein,  President 
Jacques Chirac announced, as a response to the violent crisis in the Paris suburbs in 
2005, the creation of a voluntary civil service aimed at youngsters “who failed school 
and  are  in  the  process  of  social  marginalization.”  Also  in  Argentina,  where 
conscription  was  interrupted  in  1995,  its  reimplementation  has  been  proposed  in 
Congress  to  address  the  current  crime  wave.  Similarly,  there  have  been  recent 
discussions in Peru on the potential benefits of reimplementing conscription to reduce 
violence  among  the  youth.
8  Our  results  do  not  encourage  the  introduction  of 
conscription for anti-crime or socialization purposes. 
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  II  describes  the  natural 
experiment and the main characteristics of the military service in Argentina. Section 
III presents the data, and Section IV reports the econometric methods and results. 
Section V concludes. 
 
II. The natural experiment  
From  1901  through  1995,  military  service  in  Argentina  was  mandatory.  The 
period of service lasted for a minimum of one year and a maximum of two years. The 
military  service  consisted  of  a  basic  instruction  period  of  three  months  in  which 
recruits  learned  military  norms  and  were  exposed  to  combat  training.  After  that, 
                                                 
8 For South Africa, see News24.com, “Minister moots conscription,” January 30, 2007. For France, see 
LeMonde.fr, “Jacques Chirac lance le service civil volontaire”, November 17, 2005. For Argentina, see 
LaNacion.com.ar, “Analizan  la  restitución de la  conscripción”,  October  16,  2002;  Clarin.com,  “El 
papel  de  las  fuerzas  armadas:  la  responsabilidad  social  del  estado”,  October  16,  2002; 
LaNacion.com.ar, “Susana Giménez pidió que vuelva el servicio militar obligatorio”, March 17, 2009; 
LaNacion.com.ar, “El delito no es prioridad del congreso” December 7, 2009. For Peru, see Peru21.pe, 
“Polémica por retorno del servicio militar obligatorio”, November 17, 2009.   6 
conscripts were allocated to a military unit to perform a specific duty, not necessarily 
related to military training.
9  
Young males were initially called to serve at the age of 21, and later at age 18. 
The last cohort serving at the age of 21 was the cohort born in 1955, whereas the first 
cohort serving at the age of 18 was the cohort born in 1958. Due to the age change, 
cohorts born in 1956 and 1957 were not called to serve in the military service. The 
cohort  of  1976  faced  the  conscription  draft  lottery  but  it  was  not  incorporated. 
Recruits from cohorts 1962 and 1963 participated in the Malvinas War. 
Eligibility of young males to military service was randomly assigned. Each year a 
lottery,  whose  results  were  broadcasted  by  radio  and  published  by  the  main 
newspapers, assigned a number between 1 and 1,000 to each of the last three numbers 
of the national IDs of the individuals of the cohort to be incorporated the following 
year.
10  
After the lottery, individuals were called to a physical and mental examination. 
Later on, a cut-off number was announced and those “candidates” whose ID number 
corresponded  to  a  lottery  number  above  the  cut-off  and  who  had  approved  the 
medical examination were called to serve in the military service. Among those lottery 
numbers eligible for conscription, the lowest numbers were assigned to the Army, the 
intermediate  numbers  to  the  Air  Force,  and  the  highest  numbers  to  the  Navy. 
Conscription in the Navy lasted for two years, whereas it lasted for one year in the 
Army and the Air Force. 
Clerics, seminarists, novitiates, and any men having family members dependent 
upon him for support were exempted from service. Deferment to attend college or 
                                                 
9 On the military service in Argentina, see Rodríguez Molas (1983). 
10 The lottery system was run by the National Lottery in a public session using a lottery drum filled 
with 1,000 balls and supervised by the National General Notary. The first ball released from the lottery 
drum corresponded to ID number 000, the second released ball to ID number 001, and so on.   7 
finishing  high  school  was  granted  (up  to  a  maximum  of  ten  years)  until  the 
completion of studies (Article 17 of the Law of Military Service). Deferment could 
also be granted without a particular reason for a maximum of two years (Article 16 of 
the Law of Military Service). In all cases the lottery numbers and cut-offs used to 
decide incorporation of young men asking for deferment were those corresponding to 
their own birth cohorts. 
Figure 1 displays the time-series of the proportion of men serving in the military 
by cohort for the period of mandatory military service in Argentina, corresponding to 
the cohorts of 1880 to 1975. The gradual decline from the late 1950s through the 
abolition in 1995 reflects a combination of the modernization of the armed forces, the 
gradual  resolution  of  boundary  conflicts  with  the  neighboring  countries,  and  the 
reduction in the power of the military since the definite return to democracy in 1983. 
 
III. Data 
Exploiting the random assignment of eligibility into the military service, we aim 
to identify whether serving in the conscription affects later involvement in criminal 
activities.  To  answer  this  question  we  use  two  datasets  on  criminal  participation 
provided by the Justice Ministry.
11 One dataset has information about all men who 
have  a criminal  record in  the  adult justice  system  since  1934  (about  one  million 
observations) to 2005. An individual has a criminal record if he was ever prosecuted 
or convicted of a crime. The dataset also includes the last three digits of the national 
ID number and the year of birth, but does not specify the type, number, or year of the 
crimes involved. Thus, the dataset does not distinguish if an individual committed one 
or more offences. 
                                                 
11 Dirección Nacional de Reincidencia, Ministerio de Justicia de la Nación.   8 
Our unit of observation is the combination of the cohort of birth and the last three 
numbers of the ID. The complete ID number was not provided for confidentiality 
reasons. Nevertheless, since the instrument exploited for identification only varies at 
the ID number-cohort level, this is not a nuisance for our econometric analysis. For 
each cohort-last three digits of national ID combination we calculated the crime rate 
as  the  proportion  of  the  number  of  individuals with  criminal  records  to  the  total 
number of individuals in that cohort (the population size of the cohorts was obtained 
from Census data). 
The other dataset covers a shorter period of time, but it includes information on 
the type of crime that originated the criminal record (use of arms, against property, 
sexual  attack,  threats,  murder,  drug  trafficking,  and  white  collar).  This  second 
database has detailed information on all adult men that have gone through a criminal 
process  in  the  adult  civil  justice  since  2000  to  2005  (about  a  quarter-million 
observations without specifying the year), and includes the last three ID digits, the 
year of birth, and the type of crime. In terms of this dataset, it is the same if the 
individual committed one or more offences of the same type of crime, however, he 
can appear more than once if he committed different type of crimes (in this case he 
contributes to the crime rate in each crime category).
12  
Our data come from the civil justice and do not include crimes committed before 
adulthood nor during conscription (or failure to report for induction into the military) 
as these are accounted for by the juvenile judicial system and the military justice.
13  
                                                 
12 A limitation of this alternative database is that the type of crime is only specified for 37% of the 
cases. Military service status, however, is not correlated with missing crime types in the database. 
13 As our datasets register adult criminal processes of individuals since 18 years of age, for the period 
when conscripts were called to serve at the age of 21 the database could potentially include crimes 
committed by individuals before being drafted. This, nevertheless, poses no threat to our identification 
strategy since, by virtue of randomization, crimes committed between 18 and 21 years of age will be 
balanced between intention-to-treat groups. This cannot happen for cohorts serving at the age of 18 as 
the lottery was performed the year before incorporation. Regarding contamination of the crime data   9 
Aside from crime rates we will also analyze whether participation in the military 
service  affects  labor  market  prospects.  In  particular,  we  consider  the  impact  of 
conscription  on  participation  in  the  formal  job  market,  unemployment  rates,  and 
earnings. Participation in the formal economy was precisely obtained from the social 
security database which registers social security contributions for each individual, and 
includes the national ID and year of birth.
14 For unemployment and income data we 
first identified the occupation declared by each individual in the 2003 national ballot 
registry.  As  voting  is  mandatory  in  Argentina,  every  citizen  who  is  living  in  the 
country is automatically registered. We then utilized the official household survey of 
May 2003 to input for each occupation the associated employment status and average 
hourly earnings (in Argentine pesos).
15 Unemployment rates (calculated as the share 
of unemployed over the active population) and average hourly earnings were then 
obtained for each cohort-last three digits of national ID combination.  
We  obtained  lottery  draft  results,  military  service  status,  and  cut-off  numbers 
from the Argentine Army.
16 Our analysis focuses on the cohorts of 1958 to 1962 as 
we have for them information on both the intention-to-treat and the treatment status at 
the cohort-last three digits of national ID combination. Using the lottery draft results 
and the cut-off numbers  by cohort we define  the  dummy  variable  Draft Eligible, 
which takes the value of one if the lottery number randomly assigned to cohort c and 
ID  i  was  draft-eligible  (above  the  cut-off),  and  zero  otherwise.  Thus,  the  Draft 
Eligible variable identifies the intention-to-treat on the population and, by design, it is 
randomly assigned. In addition, we construct the treatment variable Served in the 
                                                                                                                                          
with failure to report for induction into the military, that is not possible for the second dataset which 
includes the type of crime. 
14 Source: SIJP, Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones as of October of 2004. Again, for 
confidentiality reasons the complete national ID number was not provided. We obtained the rate of 
participation in the formal economy for each cohort and last three ID digits. 
15 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, INDEC. 
16 Oficina de Reclutamiento y Movilización, Estado Mayor del Ejército Argentino.   10 
Conscription as the ratio of men of cohort c and ID i who actually served in the 
conscription divided by the population size of cohort c and ID i. 
For  cohorts  1958  to  1962,  we  also  obtained  data  on  a  set  of  pre-treatment 
characteristics, such as origin (distinguishing naturalized and indigenous citizens) and 
district (the country is divided in 24 provinces). Summary statistics, using the ID-
cohort combination as the unit of observation, are reported in Table 1. The time-series 
of crime rates by eligibility status for the cohorts of 1958 to 1962 presented in Figure 
2 anticipates our main result by  showing  higher crime rates for the draft eligible 
group. 
We also have lottery draft results and cut-off assignment numbers to construct the 
intention-to-treat variable Draft Eligible for the cohorts of 1929 to 1955 and 1963 to 
1975.
17 For the cohorts of 1955 and 1965, however, the cut-off number was different 
by army corp (there were five army corps -cuerpos de ejército- in the country and the 
assignment to army corps was geographic by place of residence). Since our data do 
not allow the association of each individual to a particular army corp, in order to 
avoid measurement errors when we include these cohorts into our sample we exclude 
all  ID  numbers  whose  lottery  numbers  laid  in  between  the  maximum  and  the 
minimum cut-offs.
18 This problem becomes more severe for the cohorts of 1966 to 
1975,  as  the  cut-off  number  differed  by  military  district  (there  were  29  military 
districts in the country and the assignment to military district was also geographic) 
and  the  cut-off  differences  are  large.  Since,  again,  our  data  do  not  allow  the 
association of each individual to a particular military district, we exclude from the 
main analysis the cohorts of 1966 to 1975, and, when we report results for these 
                                                 
17 For cohorts of 1931 to 1933, 1935 to 1936, 1938, and 1941 the cut-off number was equal to zero 
(i.e., the whole cohort was assigned to provide military service). 
18 For example, if for a given cohort the cut-off number was 460 in army corp 1 and 480 in army corp 
2, we exclude from the analysis the ID numbers in those cohorts that were assigned lottery numbers 
between 460 and 480 as we are uncertain about their eligibility status.   11 
cohorts,  we  exclude  all  ID  numbers  whose  lottery  numbers  laid  in  between  the 
maximum and the minimum cut-offs. 
Although eligibility status was randomly assigned, it is useful to examine whether 
the individual’s pre-treatment characteristics are balanced across the two groups. As 
shown in Table 2, for most of the pre-determined variables available there are no 
statistically significant differences between the draft-eligible and the draft-exempted 
groups, suggesting that the randomization of draft eligibility succeeded in making 
treatment  assignment  ignorable  for  any  post-treatment  outcome  of  interest.
19  For 
those variables  where the difference is  statistically  significant, the differences are 
relatively small and, as shown in the results section, the main results in the paper do 
not  change  when  we  include  all  these  pre-treatment  characteristics  as  control 
variables in the regression function. 
We can also contrast the medical status of the draft eligible group and the draft 
ineligible group by taking advantage of information available for the cohorts of 1958 
to  1962  on  the  output  of  the  pre-induction  physical  and  mental  examination. 
Although, in principle, it is likely that lower class youths were over-represented in the 
group excluded for medical reasons, it was also the case that middle and upper class 
youths used influences and false records to avoid conscription by misreporting their 
medical  conditions.  Thus,  even  though  the  results  from  the  medical  examination 
occurred before treatment, they are contaminated by strategic behavior from those 
willing  to  avoid  incorporation,  and  hence,  they  are  not  necessarily  orthogonal  to 
eligibility  status.  Moreover,  although  in  principle  all  men  had  to  go  through  the 
                                                 
19  Similar  conclusions  are  obtained  when  we  regress  eligibility  status  on  all  the  pre-treatment 
characteristics (the associated F-statistic is equal to 1.32).   12 
medical  examination,  in  some  years  and  districts  individuals  with  evidently  low 
numbers were not called to take it.
20 
In a world without strategic behavior (and where all men were called for physical 
and  mental  revision),  we  would  expect  the  proportion  of  individuals  failing  the 
medical examination to be balanced between the draft ineligible and the draft eligible 
groups. As shown in the first row in Table 3, this is not the case: failure rates are 
significantly higher for the draft eligible group in all five cohorts. 
If  these  differences  in  failure  rates  were  due  to  differences  in  incentives  to 
misreport faced by those with high or low draft numbers, we would expect those 
individuals  with  draft  numbers  close  to  the  final  cut-off  number  to  have  similar 
incentives; after all, the exact final cut-off number was unknown at the time of the 
medical  examination.  To  explore  this  conjecture  we  calculate  failure  rates  by 
eligibility status for those individuals with draft numbers within twenty, fifteen, and 
ten numbers around the final cut-off number. As reported in Table 3, the difference in 
failure rates between the draft ineligible and the draft eligible decreases around the 
cut-off (in fact, in many cases the sign of the difference changes), and in most cases 
becomes not significant (it is never both negative and significant). That is, when we 
control for differences in incentives to misreport the medical examination between 
the draft ineligible and the draft eligible groups, failure rates are balanced between the 
two  groups.
21  On  the  one  hand,  these  results  provide  further  evidence  of  the 
exogeneity  of  draft  eligibility.  On  the  other  hand,  they  also  provide  evidence 
                                                 
20 The medical examination took place in the period between the draft lottery and the incorporation. 
21 Of course, individuals did not exactly know the cut-off number that would apply to his cohorts. 
However, they were likely to believe that the cut-off that would apply to them was going to be around 
the previous  year cut-off. In three of the five cohorts considered, the cut-off was within the ± 20 
numbers interval relative to the previous year. As a robustness check, when we replicate Table 3 using 
the previous year cut-off, the results do not change. What it is more, a graphical inspection for the five 
cohorts of the relationship between the draft lottery numbers and the failure rates shows that the latter 
is increasing up to the actual cut-off, while it clearly remains flat for the draft numbers above it. All 
results mentioned but not shown are available from the authors upon request.   13 
suggesting  that  the  medical  examinations  were  manipulated.  Though  this  renders 
military  service  status  endogenous,  it  does  not  affect  the  consistency  of  the  IV 
estimator we use in the next section to identify the effect of military service on crime.  
 
IV. Results 
We are interested in estimating the causal effect of serving in the conscription on 
(cohort-ID) crime rates. Formally, we want to estimate the following equation: 
 
ci ci c Crime Rate  Served in the Conscription ci β α δ ε = + + +  (1) 
 
where Crime Rateci is the average crime rate of cohort c and ID i (calculated as the 
ratio of men of cohort c and last three digits of ID i who have a criminal record 
divided by the population size of cohort c and last three digits of ID i),  c δ  is a cohort 
effect, α  is the average treatment effect, and  ci ε  is an error term. We also introduce 
controls for the proportion of men from each origin and district for each cohort c and 
last three digits of ID i. 
To address the endogeneity of serving in the conscription in the crime equation, 
we estimate equation (1) by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), where the endogenous 
dummy variable Served in the Conscription is instrumented by the exogenous dummy 
variable Draft Eligible.  
Figure 3 plots the conditional probability of serving in the conscription given 
lottery numbers for these cohorts. The most important feature of this figure is the 
sharp increase in the probability of service at the cut-off points. First-stage estimates 
are reported in Table 4. The point estimate of the coefficient on Draft Eligible from 
the pooled sample indicates that the probability of serving in the military for men in   14 
the cohorts 1958 to 1962 was 66 percentage points higher for those in the draft-
eligible group compared to those in the draft-exempted group. All first-stage effects 
are very precisely estimated and significantly different from zero. 
Unless we are willing to assume a constant treatment effect, the IV estimator does 
not  recover  average  treatment  effects.  Under  sensible  assumptions,  however,  it 
recovers an alternative parameter denoted Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) 
by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996). The LATE parameter is the average effect of 
treatment on those individuals whose treatment status is induced to change by the 
instrument (i.e., by the dummy variable Draft Eligible). These individuals are draft-
lottery compliers, in the sense that they served in the conscription because they were 
assigned  a  high  lottery  number,  but  would  not  have  served  otherwise.  Thus,  the 
results reported below need not generalize to the population of volunteers or to the 
population  of  young  men  that  under  no  circumstances  would  have  passed, 
legitimately or not, the pre-induction medical examination.  
 
Main Results  
Our estimates of the impact of serving in the military are reported in Table 5. We 
report estimates with and without controls. In all models our estimates indicate that 
serving in the military service significantly increases crime rates. As a benchmark, we 
first  report  reduced-form  estimates  in  columns  (1)  and  (2).  The  preferred  2SLS 
estimates in column (4) indicate that military service significantly increases crime 
rates by 3.96%. Thus, our instrumental variable results suggest that serving in the 
conscription raises a complier adult man’s lifetime probability of being prosecuted or 
incarcerated by 0.27 percentage points up from a baseline lifetime rate of prosecution 
or  conviction  of  around  6.8  percentage  points.  Hence,  the  estimates  imply  that   15 
conscription  would  raise  average  prosecution  or  conviction  rate  from  6.80%  to 
7.07%.
22 
Thus, we estimate that probability that an individual develops a criminal career 
increases on average by about 4% as a result of serving in the military service. The 
magnitude  of  these  results  can  be  compared  to  the  effect  of  other  interventions 
estimated in the crime literature. For example, Lochner and Moretti (2004) find that 
an  additional  year  of  schooling  reduces  the  probability  of  being  incarcerated  by 
roughly 0.1 percentage points for whites (from a baseline rate of 0.83 percent for high 
school dropouts) and 0.4 percentage points for blacks (from a baseline rate of 3.6 
percent for high school dropouts). Hence, in percentage terms, a year of schooling in 
the  U.S.  decreases  incarceration  by  about  11%  to  12%.  Thus,  leaving  aside  the 
differences in time horizons, crime definitions, and target populations, the socially 
negative effects  of one year  of conscription seem about one third of the socially 
positive effects of one year of additional schooling. 
As explained above, although for the cohorts of 1929 to 1955 and 1963 to 1975 
we do not have information on treatment status, we still have information on draft 
eligibility and crime rates. We use these data to produce intention-to-treat estimates 
of the impact of conscription on crime. Given random assignment, we can estimate 
straightforwardly the intention-to-treat causal effect of military service on crime by 
estimating the following reduced-form regression: 
 
ci ci c Crime Rate  Draft Eligible ci β γ δ ε = + + +  (2) 
 
                                                 
22 In these regressions population size was obtained from Census data, assigning an equal number of 
individuals  to  each  cohort-id  combination  (that  is,  the  size  of  each  cohort/id  combination  was 
calculated as the size of the cohort divided by 1,000). For the cohorts 1958 to 1962 we can estimate 
precisely the size of each cohort-id combination. Conclusions remain unchanged when we use this 
alternative calculation for the size of the cohort.   16 
where γ  is the intention-to-treat effect and everything else is as in equation (1).  
As shown in columns (5) to (7) in Table 5, we consistently find higher crime rates 
on those ID numbers that were made eligible for military service by the lottery. In 
column (5) we present the regression for the cohorts of 1929 to 1965, where we 
estimate  that  military  service  significantly  increases  crime  rates  of  draft-eligible 
individuals by 1.58%. In columns (6) and (7) we separate our sample by the time 
when military service changed the age of incorporation from 21 years to 18 years. 
The effect appears larger in the latter period reaching a rate of 2.60%, and it is smaller 
and not significant for the early period.
23 
This finding that the effect of serving in the conscription on crime is larger for 
those cohorts enrolled at age 18 could be the result of the military service being 
particularly  harmful  on  individuals  entering  the  labor  market.  As  it  is  well 
documented in the literature, the early experiences in the labor market (particularly 
unemployment) have long lasting effects on individuals’ labor market performance 
(Smith, 1985). Instead, for those cohorts enrolled at age 21, the effect of military 
service on crime channeled through the labor market could be less severe, especially 
since firms had to keep their jobs open and give them a license period to serve in the 
military service. It is also possible that younger people are just more sensitive to this 
treatment. However, the differential impact cannot be only attributed to the change in 
the age of enrollment, as several conditions, including secular increases in crime and 
data recording, could have changed for the cohorts of 1958 to 1965 relative to the 
cohorts of 1929 to 1955. 
                                                 
23 As explained above, for the cohorts 1966 to 1975 the cut-off numbers differed across the 29 military 
districts. The results show no change if we still include in the regressions the cohort-ID combinations 
for which we are positive there is no measurement error on their eligibility status.   17 
Even when our study relies on a well documented randomization, we still conduct 
three false experiments to further test the exogeneity of our instrument. First, we 
restrict the sample to those observations with a low number in the lottery (i.e., not 
eligible). We sort the low numbers for each cohort and divide them by their median, 
assigning a false treatment status to the IDs above the median. As it should be if the 
lottery  was  truly  random,  we  do  not  find  differences  in  the  crime  rates  of  these 
groups. This is particularly relevant since, as reported in footnote 21, we found that 
the medical failure rate was increasing up to the actual cut-off while it remains flat for 
the draft lottery numbers above it. Thus, although the two non-eligible groups created 
by this procedure show different failure rates in the medical examination, there are no 
differences in their crime rates. 
Second, we restrict the sample to cohorts 1956 and 1957 (which fully skipped 
military service because of the change in the age of incorporation from 21 years to 18 
years),  imputing them the draft lottery results  corresponding  to cohorts 1958 and 
1959, which they would have obtained under no age change. Since these cohorts were 
not drafted, we should not observe any significant crime differences between the two 
groups, and this is, indeed, what we find. 
Third, we take advantage of the fact that the cohort of 1976 faced the conscription 
draft lottery but it was not incorporated. We create a faked cut-off number for this 
cohort based on the cut-offs numbers for the cohort of 1975. When we compare crime 
rates for those with “high” and “low” numbers, we find no differences in crime rates 
between the two groups.
24 
                                                 
24 The coefficient for the faked dummy for being draft eligible has the opposite sign and it is not 
significant (the point estimate is -0.0012 with a standard error of 0.0009). The last false experiment 
also addresses the potential concern that the outcome of the lottery could have a direct effect on crime 
besides real conscription participation. For example, the lottery result could directly affect the morale 
of young men, depressing those who are made eligible by the lottery. In this case, the instrument would 
affect crime rates directly through the “depression” effect and not through its effect on serving in the   18 
In Table 6 we first explore differential effects of military service in peace and war 
times.  Even  though  only  a  small  fraction  of  the  draftees  in  the  two  cohorts  that 
participated in the Malvinas War were exposed to combat (from the 440,000 men in 
cohorts 1962 and 1963, approximately 12,500 conscripts participated in the war and 
had, therefore, some level of combat exposure) most of the incorporated conscripts 
were mobilized to Patagonia and the South Atlantic, the conflict region. Results in 
columns (1) and (2) indicate that the effect of military service on crime is larger for 
those  draftees  in  the  two  cohorts  that  participated  in  the  Malvinas  War.  It  is 
noteworthy that the effect is also significant for the cohorts that provided military 
service during peace times, which comprise most of our sample. 
We also show in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 that the effect of conscription on 
crime was larger for those that did the military service in the Navy, which served for 
two years instead of the one year served in the Army and the Air Force.
25,26 This 
result is consistent with early experience in the labor market being a channel through 
which the military service affects criminal behavior.
27 
                                                                                                                                          
conscription. As explained above, when using the lottery numbers for the cohort of 1976 which faced 
the  conscription  draft  lottery  but  it  was  not  incorporated,  there  are  no  differences  in  crime  rates 
between those that were and were not at risk of incorporation. 
25 Of course, serving in the Navy can be thought as a different treatment compared to serving in the 
Army or in the Air Force; for instance, young men serving in the Navy may have been exposed to a 
more violent environment since ports are usually places with high levels of criminal activity.  
26 We estimate the regressions in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 in reduced form as we do not have 
treatment status information to identify the individuals that actually participated in the Malvinas War 
out of the men incorporated from the 1962 cohort. Similarly, we estimate the regressions in columns 
(3) and (4) in reduced form as we know the Navy/Air Force/Army cut-offs numbers, but we do not 
have actual treatment information by armed force of incorporation. If we combine the intention-to-treat 
Malvinas War and Navy variables with the treatment variable Served in the Conscription in 2SLS 
regressions for the 1958-62 cohorts, the Malvinas War and Navy coefficients are positive, but not 
statistically significant, whereas Served in the Conscription remains highly significant. 
27 We also explore the interaction of conscription and dictatorial (military) government. The effect of 
conscription on crime seems to have been homogeneous for draftees providing military service during 
democratic and dictatorial governments. The participation of conscripts in violations of human rights 
during  the  military  dictatorship  of  1976-83  was  minimal,  and  there  are  no  cases  of  conscripts 
prosecuted for those types of crime. In addition, we explore possible heterogeneity in the effects using 
information on the available pre-treatment characteristics for the cohorts of 1958 to 1962 subject to the 
constraint of only having information at the cohort-ID, not individual data level. As explained above, 
for these cohorts we have information on the proportion of indigenous citizens for each cohort-ID 
combination.  We  also  have  pre-treatment  district  data  that  we  use  to  construct  the  proportion  of   19 
 
Complementary Results 
Our main results suggest that conscription increases the likelihood of developing 
a criminal record during adulthood. One potential explanation is that military service 
may have delayed the insertion of the young into the labor market affecting future 
opportunities. The latter interpretation is consistent with the additional deleterious 
effect observed for those that provided service in the Navy for two years.  
To try to shed additional light on the channels through which military service 
could have affected criminal behavior, we use an alternative dataset that covers a 
shorter period of time, but includes the type of crime. Whereas the database we have 
used so far has information on all criminal records since the mid 1930s, the newer 
database has information on all men that have gone through the adult criminal justice 
system since 2000, but details the type of crime.  
In  Table  7,  we  estimate  the  effect  of  military  service  by  type  of  crime.  As 
discussed  above,  one  hypothesis  is  that  participation  in  the  military  service  may 
negatively affect the labor market prospects of young men by delaying their insertion 
in the labor market, thus inducing them to commit pecuniary crimes. This hypothesis 
implies  that  property  and  white-collar  crimes,  which  have  a  pecuniary  purpose, 
should be lower for those men not serving in the military service. In agreement with 
this hypothesis, the 2SLS coefficients associated with military service provision are 
positive and significant in the regressions on property and white-collar crimes. The 
reduced form results for cohorts 1958-62 and 1958-65 in the second and third panels 
coincide with these findings. 
                                                                                                                                          
individuals between 25 and 39 years old with university studies and proportion of rural population for 
each cohort-id combination. When we interact these three pre-treatment variables and the treatment 
assignment, we find that the interaction effects are not significant.  
   20 
To further explore the labor market channel, in Table 8 we present results of the 
impact of conscription on participation in the formal job market, unemployment, and 
earnings. Overall, our results suggest that men serving in the military service have a 
lower probability of participating in the formal job market, a higher unemployment 
rate  (though  not  significant),  and  lower  future  earnings.  The  negative  effect  of 
military service on job market performance supports the hypothesis of the detrimental 
effect of military service on criminal behavior through the labor market.  
 The result of a negative impact of military service on labor market outcomes is 
not  novel.  Previous  work  by  Angrist  (1990)  suggests  that  the  private  cost  of 
conscription in terms of lost wages could be extremely high –as high as 15% of 
wages for white veterans in their mid-30s for servicing in the army for two years. 
Imbens and  van der Klaauw  (1995) find a somewhat lower effect of compulsory 
military service in the Netherlands. They estimate the cost of military service in terms 
of earnings in about 5% per year –for servicing in the army for only one year about 
10 years after completing service. Both articles present evidence suggesting that the 
causal  mechanism  for  this  relationship  is  lost  labor  market  experience  (see  also 
Angrist, 1998).  
However, it is worth noting that, given that job market outcomes in our study 
correspond to 19 to 26 years after serving in the military, we are estimating a long-
term impact of military service on job market performance.
 In this sense, our results 
showing a relatively low impact of conscription on labor market outcomes are in line 
with the ones presented in Angrist and Chen (2007), who measure the impact 28 to 30 
years after serving in Vietnam and also report very low long-term impact of veteran 
status on job market outcomes. 
   21 
V. Conclusions 
We estimate the causal effect of the participation in the military service on crime. 
A  priori,  different  hypotheses  could  predict  a  positive  or  negative  effect  of 
conscription  on  the  involvement  into  criminal  behavior.  We  exploit  the  random 
assignment  of  young  men  to  conscription  in  Argentina  through  a  draft  lottery  to 
identify this causal effect. Our results suggest that, even though military conscription 
incapacitates the commission of crime by keeping young men out of the streets and 
potentially improves their inclusion into society, there are mechanisms operating in 
the opposite direction in such a way that the overall impact of conscription is to 
increase the likelihood of developing a criminal record in adulthood. Although the 
effect is stronger for the cohorts that participated in the Malvinas War, our original 
contribution  is  to  show  a  deleterious  effect  of  peace-time  conscription  on  future 
criminal participation. This effect is small, but precisely estimated. 
Additional evidence suggests that a particular channel through which this effect 
could have operated is by delaying the conscripts’ insertion in the labor market. Our 
findings  that  military  service  has  detrimental  effects  on  future  job  market 
performance, and the stronger crime effects for pecuniary (property and white collar) 
crimes and for the individuals that provided longer conscription service are consistent 
with this hypothesis.   22 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for men born 1958-1962 
  Mean  Standard Deviation  Observations 
Draft Eligible  0.6998  0.4584  5,000 
Served in the Conscription  0.5031  0.3049  5,000 
Navy  0.1196  0.3245  5,000 
Malvinas War  0.1362  0.3430  5,000 
    Crime Variables   
Crime Rate  0.0693  0.0178  5,000 
Use of Arms  0.0010  0.0024  5,000 
Against Property  0.0075  0.0073  5,000 
Sexual Attack  0.0007  0.0021  5,000 
Murder  0.0009  0.0021  5,000 
Threat  0.0017  0.0031  5,000 
Drug Trafficking  0.0012  0.0028  5,000 
White Collar  0.0034  0.0046  5,000 
  Labor Market Variables 
Participation in the Formal Job Market  0.3387  0.0470  5,000 
Unemployment Rate  0.1797  0.0543  5,000 
Earnings  3.1734  0.2343  5,000 
  Pre-Treatment Characteristics 
Argentine Born (not indigenous)  0.9986  0.0026  5,000 
Indigenous Argentine  0.0009  0.0020  5,000 
Naturalized Argentine  0.0005  0.0017  5,000 
  Pre-Treatment Characteristics – District of Residence 
Buenos Aires  0.3448  0.0326  5,000 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires  0.0855  0.0186  5,000 
Catamarca  0.0096  0.0064  5,000 
Chaco  0.0347  0.0114  5,000 
Chubut  0.0095  0.0061  5,000 
Córdoba  0.0869  0.0186  5,000 
Corrientes  0.0321  0.0107  5,000 
Entre Ríos  0.0388  0.0121  5,000 
Formosa  0.0150  0.0080  5,000 
Jujuy  0.0169  0.0083  5,000 
La Pampa  0.0075  0.0054  5,000 
La Rioja  0.0077  0.0054  5,000 
Mendoza  0.0435  0.0125  5,000 
Misiones  0.0277  0.0104  5,000 
Neuquén  0.0087  0.0059  5,000 
Río Negro  0.0130  0.0071  5,000 
Salta  0.0274  0.0102  5,000 
San Juan  0.0187  0.0087  5,000 
San Luis  0.0086  0.0059  5,000 
Santa Cruz  0.0034  0.0038  5,000 
Santa Fé  0.0863  0.0173  5,000 
Santiago del Estero  0.0289  0.0108  5,000 
Tierra del Fuego  0.0008  0.0019  5,000 
Tucumán  0.0406  0.0121  5,000 
Note:  The  level  of  observation  is  the  cohort-ID  number  combination.  Earnings  are  hourly  earnings  in 
Argentine pesos. Participation in the formal job market as of 2004. Unemployment rates and earnings as of 
2003.   27
 
Table 2. Differences in pre-treatment characteristics by eligibility group and cohort 
Differences by Cohort 
(Draft  Exempt - Draft Eligible)  Cohort 1958  Cohort 1959  Cohort 1960  Cohort 1961  Cohort 1962 
Argentine Born  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0001 
(not indigenous)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Indigenous Argentine  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Naturalized Argentine  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
Districts           
Buenos Aires  0.0042  0.0007  0.0021  -0.0018  -0.0013 
  (0.0026)  (0.0023)  (0.0023)  (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires  0.0022  0.0004  -0.0038***  0.0013  0.0038*** 
  (0.0016)  (0.0013)  (0.0010)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Catamarca  -0.0007  -0.0007  0.0000  0.0004  -0.0001 
  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Chaco  -0.0005  0.0010  -0.0004  0.0006  -0.0012 
  (0.0009)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
Chubut  0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0005 
  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Córdoba  -0.0015  0.0025**  0.0038**  -0.0010  0.0011 
  (0.0015)  (0.0012)  (0.0015)  (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
Corrientes  -0.0017*  -0.0012*  0.0011  0.0005  -0.0005 
  (0.0010)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Entre Ríos  -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0003  0.0010  -0.0008 
  (0.0010)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0007) 
Formosa  -0.0004  0.0008  0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004 
  (0.0007)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
Jujuy  -0.0007  -0.0002  -0.0009*  0.0008  -0.0017*** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0005) 
La Pampa  0.0006  0.0006  0.0003  -0.0007*  0.0000 
  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
La Rioja  0.0000  -0.0008**  -0.0004  0.0000  -0.0004 
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Mendoza  0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0004  0.0018** 
  (0.0011)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  (0.0008) 
Misiones  -0.0009  0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0005 
  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
Neuquén  0.0001  0.0003  -0.0003  0.0003  -0.0003 
  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Río Negro  -0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0005 
  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0005) 
Salta  0.0000  -0.0005  0.0011*  -0.0002  0.0002 
  (0.0009)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
San Juan  0.0006  0.0000  -0.0007  -0.0001  0.0006 
  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0006) 
San Luis  0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0003 
  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Santa Cruz  -0.0002  -0.0004*  0.0001  0.0000  0.0003   28
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
Santa Fé  -0.0011  0.0005  0.0002  0.0016  0.0006 
  (0.0014)  (0.0012)  (0.0011)  (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Santiago del Estero  -0.0001  -0.0020***  -0.0005  -0.0003  -0.0004 
  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
Tierra del Fuego  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001 
  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Tucumán  0.0011  0.0011  -0.0007  -0.0008  -0.0010 
  (0.0011)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0008) 
Note:  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  The  level  of  observation  is  the  cohort-ID  number  combination. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.   29
 
 
Table 3. Differences in failure rates in the medical examination  
by eligibility group and cohort  
Differences by Cohort       (Draft  
Exempt - Draft Eligible)  Cohort 1958  Cohort 1959  Cohort 1960  Cohort 1961  Cohort 1962 
All numbers  -0.0017  -0.0016  -0.0143***  -0.0197***  -0.0232*** 
  (0.0014)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
20 numbers around the final   0.0027  -0.0043  0.0009  0.0141**  -0.0060 
cut-off number  (0.0050)  (0.0068)  (0.0056)  (0.0053)  (0.0059) 
15 numbers around the final   0.0038  -0.0060  0.0008  0.0129*  -0.0034 
cut-off number  (0.0056)  (0.0085)  (0.0070)  (0.0066)  (0.0070) 
10 numbers around the final   0.0077  -0.0044  -0.0043  0.0108  0.0017 
cut-off number  (0.0056)  (0.0116)  (0.0090)  (0.0075)  (0.0083) 
Note:  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  The  level  of  observation  is  the  cohort-ID  number  combination. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.   30
Table 4. First stage by cohort 
  Dependent Variable: Served in the Conscription 
Cohorts  1958-62  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Draft Eligible  0.6587***  0.6279***  0.6210***  0.6505***  0.6972***  0.6853*** 
  (0.0012)  (0.0033)  (0.0027)  (0.0018)  (0.0017)  (0.0019) 
Constant  0.0421***  0.0578***  0.0389***  0.0377***  0.0556***  0.0343*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0030)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0011)  (0.0007) 
Observations  5,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is the cohort-ID number 
combination. Column (1) includes cohort dummies. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the impact of conscription on crime rates 
  Dependent Variable: Crime Rate 
Cohorts  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1929-65  1929-55  1958-65 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Draft Eligible   0.0018  0.0018      0.0006  0.0003  0.0012 
  (0.0006)***  (0.0006)***      (0.0003)**  (0.0004)  (0.0004)*** 
Served in the Conscription      0.0026  0.0027       
      (0.0008)***  (0.0008)***       
% Change  3.75  3.96  3.75  3.96  1.58  0.69  2.60 
Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  34,904  26,976  7,928 
Method  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is the cohort-ID number combination. All models include cohort dummies. The models in 
columns (2) and (4) include controls for origin (naturalized or indigenous) and district (the country is divided in 24 districts). In 2SLS models the instrument for Served in the 
Conscription is Draft Eligible. % Change for 2SLS models is calculated as 100*Estimate/mean crime rate of draft-ineligible men. For intention-to-treat models, % Change is 
reported as 100*Wald estimate/mean crime rate of draft-ineligible men, where the Wald estimate is calculated as ITT estimate/(p1-p2), where p1 is the probability of serving in the 
conscription among those that are draft-eligible, and p2 is the probability of serving in the conscription among those that are not draft-eligible (since we do not have information 
on compliance rates outside the cohorts of 1958 to 1962, in all cases we use the compliance rates for this period). **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.  
   32 
 
 
Table 6. Peace vs. war times and one-year vs. two-years 
  Dependent Variable: Crime Rate 
Cohorts  1929-65  1958-65  1929-65  1958-65 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Draft Eligible  0.00047  0.0009  0.0005  0.0010 
  (0.0003)*  (0.0005)*  (0.0003)**  (0.0004)** 
Malvinas War  0.0015  0.0011     
  (0.0009)*
  (0.0010)     
Navy (2 years)      0.0007  0.0011 
      (0.0003)**  (0.0006)* 
Observations  34,904  7,928  34,904  7,928 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Notes:  Robust  standard  errors  are  shown  in  parentheses.  The  level  of  observation  is  the  cohort-ID  number 
combination. Cohorts 1956 and 1957 were not called for military service. All models include cohort dummies. 
*Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level.   33 
Table 7. Estimates of the impact of conscription on crime rates, by type of crime 
  Use of Arms  Against Property  Sexual Attack  Murder  Threat  Drug Trafficking  White Collar 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Cohorts  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62 
Served in the  0.00013  0.00082  0.00013  -0.00007  0.00022  -0.00009  0.00064 
Conscription  (0.00011)  (0.00034)**  (0.00009)  (0.00010)  (0.00014)  (0.00014)  (0.00021)*** 
% Change  0.20  1.21  0.20  -0.11  0.32  -0.13  0.94 
Observations  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000 
Method  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Cohorts  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62  1958-62 
Draft Eligible   0.00009  0.00054  0.00009  -0.00005  0.00015  -0.00006  0.00042 
  (0.00007)  (0.00022)**  (0.00006)  (0.00007)  (0.00009)  (0.00009)  (0.00014)*** 
% Change  0.20  1.21  0.20  -0.11  0.32  -0.13  0.94 
Observations  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21) 
Cohorts  1958-65  1958-65  1958-65  1958-65  1958-65  1958-65  1958-65 
Draft Eligible  0.00006  0.00025    0.00002  -0.00003  0.00010  -0.00001  0.00021 
  (0.00006)  (0.00018)  (0.00005)  (0.00005)  (0.00007)  (0.00007)  (0.00011)* 
% Change  0.15  0.56  0.04  -0.07  0.24  -0.01  0.48 
Observations  7,928  7,928  7,928  7,928  7,928  7,928  7,928 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is the cohort-ID number combination. All models include cohort dummies. In 2SLS models the 
instrument for Served in the Conscription is Draft Eligible. % Change for 2SLS models is calculated as 100*Estimate/mean dependent variable of draft-ineligible men. For 
intention-to-treat models, % Change is reported as 100*Wald estimate/mean dependent variable of draft-ineligible men, where the Wald estimate is calculated as ITT estimate/(p1-
p2), where p1 is the probability of serving in the conscription among those that are draft-eligible, and p2 is the probability of serving in the conscription among those that are not 
draft-eligible (since we do not have information on compliance rates outside the cohorts of 1958 to 1962, in all cases we use the compliance rates for this period). *Significant at the 
10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 8. Estimates of the impact of conscription on labor market outcomes 
  Participation in the Formal Job Market 
Cohorts  1958-62  1958-62  1958-65 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Draft Eligible  -0.0015    -0.0018 
  (0.0014)    (0.0010)* 
Served in the Conscription    -0.0022   
    (0.0022)   
% Change  -0.65  -0.65  -0.80 
  Unemployment Rate 
  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Draft Eligible  0.0005    0.0004 
  (0.0006)    (0.0005) 
Served in the Conscription    0.0008   
    (0.0009)   
% Change  0.41  0.41  0.29 
  Earnings 
  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Draft Eligible  -0.0111    -0.0176 
  (0.0070)    (0.0055)*** 
Served in the Conscription    -0.0169   
    (0.0106)   
% Change  -0.53  -0.53  -0.84 
Observations  5,000  5,000  7,928 
Method  OLS  2SLS  OLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The level of observation is the cohort-ID number 
combination. Participation in the formal job market as of 2004. Unemployment rates and earnings as of 
2003. Earnings are hourly earnings in Argentine pesos. All models include cohort dummies. In 2SLS 
models the instrument for Served in the Conscription is Draft Eligible. % Change for 2SLS models is 
calculated  as  100*Estimate/mean  dependent  variable  of  draft-ineligible  men.  For  intention-to-treat 
models, % Change is reported as 100*Wald estimate/mean dependent variable of draft-ineligible men, 
where the Wald estimate is calculated as ITT estimate/(p1-p2), where p1 is the probability of serving in the 
conscription among those that are draft-eligible, and p2 is the probability of serving in the conscription 
among those that are not draft-eligible (since we do not have information on compliance rates outside the 
cohorts of 1958 to 1962, in all cases we use the compliance rates for this period). *Significant at the 10% 
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Figure 1. Proportion of men serving in the conscription by cohort  
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Note: Cohorts 1956 and 1957 were not called to military service.   36 
Figure 2. Crime rates by eligibility status for the cohorts 1958-62 
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Figure 3. The relation between the conditional probability of serving in the 
conscription and draft lottery numbers for the cohorts of 1958 to 1962 
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Note: In order to smooth out fluctuations, we placed the 1,000 lottery numbers in 200 groups of five 
numbers (1 to 5 in the first one, 6 to 10 in the second one, and so on) and calculated the average within 
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